Debate over the Hungarian secret services

Summary:

In recent years, the declared and unrealised reforms characterised the policies of the Hungarian government with respect to the secret services. The reforms declared as a political objective, i.e., the merger of the two civilian and two military services was a total failure. This cannot be simply translated into a failure of the services concerned about their particular interests - the National Security Office (NHB), the Information Office (IH), the Military Intelligence Office (KFH), the Military Security Office (KBH) and the National Security Special Service, providing services - to act in order to validate their interests. It is more likely that the experiment - without being construed by the government as a top priority issue and without in-depth and constructive consultations and agreements with the opposition - was doomed from the onset.

Analysis:

The abuse by Gyurcsány-government of the national security services undermined any form of constructive dialogue and possible consensus. Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány delegated the direction of the civilian services to György Szilvásy, his controversial confidante - also with a KISZ (Communist Youth League) background. The scale of the abuse of power is already familiar to the international community. In 2006 - including the period of the election campaign - there was not a single important event staged by the opposition that would not have been preceded by threats of pending terrorist attacks by Slovak and/or Hungarian extremists, or journalists would not have been harassed by the National Security Office. Furthermore, the armed attack on the National Police Headquarters (in Teve utca) occurred under questionable circumstances, while the sudden emergence and provocative activities of particular extremist individuals and organisations are suspicious too.

However, Szilvásy, who rejects any principle promoting the democratic self-regulation of the political power, as well as the preservation of the professionalism of the national security services, namely, the validation of the tenet of non-intervention in domestic policy, would not have been adequate for the purpose of defiling the work of the services to such a degree, unless he found partners among leaders of the services, or in the Hungarian Socialist Party and in the circle of former network-members working as ’experts’ in the Prime Minister’s Office. Whatever motivations propelled some of the heads of these services - political allegiance, petty interest or advantages - they were nonetheless servants to this undemocratic and unconstitutional policy. This does not only destroy their professional and leadership credibility, but they also diminished public confidence vis-a-vis the institutions under their control to the minimum following the regime change. The circumstances with respect to the departure of the former head of the NBH, Lajos Galambos, demonstrate the conditions surrounding the services. The departure of the director-general was linked to the tax-fraud between the service under his command and a foundation connected to the service, as well as to the revelation with regard to attempts to conceal the criminal act.

Following the dismissal of the chief of counterintelligence, the service had only an acting head for nearly half a year, which is questionable on its own merit: all the more so, because during this period an unprecedented reorganisation of the inner structure of the service was carried out since 1990 - with the replacement of the entire middle-management sector. This rearrangement becomes ostensible in light of the latest report of Szilvásy. The minister without portfolio responsible for the civilian secret services announced the personnel changes at the helm of the national security services on October 30th. László Balajti will be the principal director of the National Security Special Services, Zsolt Hetesy - the head of this service hitherto - will be the principle director of the Information Office (IH), the intelligence. (The former principal director of the IH, István Zsohár, died on October 3rd.) The National Security Office will be lead by the principal director-elect and former deputy principle director, Sándor Laborcz.

The appointment of Laborc to the port of principle director has been in the air for half a year and evoked the vehement protest of the opposition. The appointment of the new head of the National Security Office sheds new light on the process of the inner-restructuring, as well as on the replacement of the middle-management. This move has been explained by the alleged efforts to rejuvenate the government and to increase efficacy. However, with the appointment of new middle-managers they ostensibly attempted to reinforce the position of the controversial Laborc.

The records of Laborc demonstrate that - apart from his loyalty to the MSZP and Gyurcsány - he might have contacts that have strategic bearing. In the previous regime, the future head of counterintelligence studied for six years in the Dzerzhinsky Academy in Moscow together with the heads of current Russian intelligence and counterintelligence. Some experts opine that this is a long-enough time-span that might, in some circumstances, lead to an exposure of some kind of influence, or blackmail, which might prevail even today. The opposition perceives a connection between the early retirement of Laborc from intelligence (1999) and the investigations concerning financial irregularities with an off-shore company. They consider it strange and incomprehensible that an already retired national security officer is reactivated (2002, the Medgyessy-government) and is appointed to an important post. The opposition poses the question, too, as to whether there is a connection between the exceptional ascent in the career of Laborc and the alleged increase in the activities of Russian intelligence in Hungary and the absence of national security activity that was ostensible with regard to the intensifying debates in 2006 surrounding the gas-pipelines.

The Hungarian government drew attention of the national community, too, since it is a priority in NATO to block Russian infiltration in the services, which is valid even nowadays.

Conclusion:

The governing party and the prime minister, which are losing popularity and are rejected more than the extremist parties, are prepared for another unusual step. In order to counteract the series of domestic political debacles, the prime minister is prepared to turn to the instruments of ’subjective interpretation of democracy’. The national security services could play an important role to this effect. Provocations, intimidation, harassments - are familiar concepts in Hungarian domestic politics once again. In the meantime, the professional operation of national security services are increasingly more uncertain.

Source : Budapest Analyses