In our age - a global age, that is now also an age of terror - transnational policing has become an expanding, diverse and complex field of activity. In the face of criminal organizations and networks who operate across many states, and whose modus operandi involves illicitly trafficking people, drugs, information, nuclear materials or stolen goods across national borders, long-standing international police institutions such as Interpol have been joined, and arguably superseded in importance, by the internationalization of US policing and by the development of new forms of police networking and cross-border cooperation within the European Union (EU) - notably in the shape of Europol (Nadelman, 1993; Anderson et al., 1995; Deflem, 2003). The problems of weak or failing states engaged in armed conflict for the control of territory, or harboring criminal or terrorist groups, has prompted overt and covert police/military interventions by outside states, as well as intermittent UN or EU peacekeeping missions and the harm-alleviating efforts of transnational civil society (Caygill, 2001; Linden et al., this volume). They have, in addition, provided opportunities for transnational security and military firms to promote and sell protective services to either weak states, or to multinational corporations seeking to do business in those states (Johnston, 2000; Muthien and Taylor, 2002; Singer, 2003). And, as constitutive elements of the ‘war on terror’ launched in response to 9/11, we have witnessed, alongside the unilateral assertion of US security interests and the strengthening of state security institutions, an extension of cross-border surveillance activity and information-sharing, an enhanced role for opaque networks of police and intelligence chiefs in Europe, and the deployment of soldiers, police officers and contracted security guards in post-war ‘peace-keeping’ efforts on the streets of Afghanistan and Iraq (den Boer and Monar, 2002; Lyon, 2003).
These developments signal that a bundle of once clear distinctions - between external and internal security; policing and soldiering; war and crime; state combatants exercising legitimate force and unarmed civilian non-combatants - is fast breaking down (Kaldor, 1999; Bigo, 2000). They also indicate that states acting alone, or solely within their own borders, are no longer a sufficient or effective means of producing security within those borders, still less some more expansive notion of regional or global security. We inhabit a world of multi-level, multi-centred security governance, in which states are joined, criss-crossed and contested by an array of transnational organizations and actors - whether in regional and global governmental bodies, commercial security outfits, or a burgeoning number of non-governmental organizations and social movements that compose transnational civil society. It is a world in which policing has, however haltingly and unevenly, been both stretched across the frontiers of states and tasked with combating what are often overlapping problems of global organized crime and political violence.
Yet while policing has become inter- and trans-nationalized in these ways, the state has remained the traditional community of democratic attachment and the principal - if by no means any longer the sole - institutional locus of efforts to subject security practices to forms of public scrutiny, legal control and regimes of human rights protection. We are faced, as a consequence, with a field of transnational policing and security activity marked by the weakness or absence of appropriately located institutions of democratic steering, public accountability and legal regulation. This gives rise, in turn, to opaque, self-corroborating and fugitive sites of public and private power that simultaneously possess deficits of legitimacy and effectiveness; something that presents some hard and urgent political questions about how - in this sphere of transnational activity - we can give meaning and expression to notions like democracy, equality, solidarity and security that have been rooted and nourished in the modern age within national political communities (Held and McGrew, 2002: 58; Keane, 2003: 58-9). In a world that has decoupled the connection between ‘sovereignty, territory and political power’, the ‘proper locus of politics and the articulation of the public interest’ becomes ‘a puzzling matter’ (Held and McGrew, 2002: 127, 129).
It is against this backdrop that we try in this paper to tackle what David Held (2004: 166) calls ‘one of the principal political questions of our time’- namely, that of ‘how global public goods’ - in the present case policing and security - ‘can best be provided’. We want, in particular, to specify the ways in which the idea of the public interest may be conceptually reworked and institutionally relocated within today’s pluralized transnational security configuration. To this end, we proceed as follows. Taking as our point of departure recent work on this topic conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme, and seeking to ‘thicken’ the suggestive framework provided there (Kaul et al., 1999a; 2003a), we begin by identifying the issues that arise in seeking to reconceptualize and deliver policing and security - with their constitutive links to sovereign statehood - as global public goods. We then briefly review five competing models of transnational security in this light, examining the capacity of each to address and offer an adequate resolution of the problems we identify. Having thus specified the merits and deficiencies of each model, we conclude by sketching the outlines of a pluralist account of policing as a global public good - one that is sociologically tenable as well as normatively robust.
IN SEARCH OF THE TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC INTEREST
In his recent book, Global Covenant, David Held argues that:
The provision of public goods can no longer be equated with state-provided goods alone. Diverse state and non-state actors shape and contribute to their provision - and they need to if some of the most profound challenges of globalization are to be met. Moreover, some core public goods have to be provided regionally and globally if they are to be provided at all. (2004: 16)
How - in the field of policing and security - can we best make conceptual sense of this project? How might policing be delivered and regulated in these terms? Can we identify - at the level of normative principle and institutional articulation - a public interest in the diverse, multi-site, multi-actor field of transnational policing? Within the more familiar terrain of state policing the difficulties in this respect are apparent enough, and in a contemporary context marked by the increased diversity of policing forms, the increased representation of private arrangement within this diverse configuration, an increased emphasis upon professional ‘security knowledge’ as a primary register of legitimate authority, and the increased emphasis upon policing needs - even within notionally ‘public’ arrangements - as responding to the disaggregated interests of consumers rather than some broader collective interest, such difficulties are compounded (Loader, 2000). But by introducing yet another layer of private and public authority, by providing a further tier of professional bureaucracy even more remote from the concerns of national ‘demoi’ and even more self-confident in the primacy of its security knowledge and imperatives, by focusing on a range of crimes of which most citizens have only mediated knowledge, and by contributing to a general movement of governance away from the state - the traditional community of democratic attachment, new transnational policing arrangements in the EU and beyond exacerbate these problems still further (Walker, 2002; 2003). How might we steer a course through them?
A useful starting point here is the collaborative project conducted under the umbrella of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on ‘global public goods’ (Kaul et al., 1999a; 2003a). This project begins from a standard economic definition of public goods as those whose consumption is ‘non-excludable’ and ‘non-rival’ - to provide for one is to provide for all, enjoyment by one does not detract from their enjoyment by all. Street lighting, clean air and national defence are among the paradigm cases of public goods thus conceived. Because of the externality and free-riding problems associated with the (market) provision of such goods, they require some mechanism of compulsory collective action if they are to be adequately provided or even provided at all, and the state is generally considered to be the most fitting of such mechanisms. Global public goods share these elements. But, according to Kaul et al. (1999b), they possess the added criteria that their benefits - or, in the case of ‘public bads’, costs - ‘extend across countries and regions, across rich and poor population groups, and even across generations’ (Kaul et al., 2003b: 3). A pollution-free environment and financial stability are cited as examples here, as, importantly, is peace and security.
Let us try to tease out some of the more detailed implications of this analysis. Even if we accept the standard economic definition as a starting-point (and it is one which, in due course, we will seek to supplement), the gradual shift in the level of optimal provision of public goods to the global level raises opportunities and dangers which are different not only in scale but also in kindfrom those which pertain where the major and most appropriate site of provision of public goods is the state level. The differences in scale are self-evident. The prize of the successful institutionalization of a mechanism of compulsory collective provision becomes the inclusive and cost-efficient supply of a good at a global level, while the penalty of failure is exclusion, cost-inefficiency and perhaps, in a context where the scope for negative externalities is greatly increased, an unraveling of domestic solutions to problems of collective action, such that all or most states become net losers in the endeavour to secure the benefits of the relevant goods to their respective populations.
In order fully to appreciate these possibilities, however, we must turn to the differences in kind in the structure of public goods provision as we move from the national to the global. In the classic economic analysis, the alternative and perhaps rival unit of supply of the good in question is either, on the one hand, the market agent supplying the private individual or group of private individuals, or on the other, the ‘club’ - in which a self-defining and so exclusionary group come together to provide for their own consumption at least some of the benefits associated with non-rivalness - of cost-efficient provision of a good whose common supply is no detriment to individual enjoyment. As we move to a context of high transnational interdependence, however, not only do the number of market agents or clubs who are candidate suppliers of the same or overlapping goods exponentially increase, but other statesalso become relevant as alternative and perhaps rival suppliers of the same or overlapping goods.
The introduction of other states into the equation changes the picture dramatically, for a number of reasons. First, these other states are typically authoritatively constituted in such a way that their role in the solution or creation of collective action problems is, broadly speaking, less easily controlled or influenced by the first state than if they were private or club actors. Secondly, and again broadly speaking, other states have a greater capacity for action, and so a greater propensity to produce not only the public goods themselves but also negative externalities which prejudice the first state’s capacity to generate public goods, than do other individual or club actors. Thirdly, being also states, these other states share with the first state the same set of priorities and incentives - and crucially underlying this, the same cultural orientation - to be the dominant provider of public goods for their respective populations. Their propensity to rival the first state, in other words, inheres not in their seeking to provide the benefits associated with public goods from different motivationsand by different means, as with private agents or clubs, but in their seeking in an interdependent world to bring the same motives to bear, and to use the same means, for the primary benefit of different populations.
We will return to some of these more detailed points in due course, and in particular will have more to say about the cultural dimension of the state’s production of public goods. For now, it is important simply to register the conclusion of Kaul and her collaborators that in the present institutional configuration of global politics the dangers in the shift from a national to a global contexts of optimal provision of public goods seem to overshadow the opportunities. They convincingly claim that there is in the world today a ‘serious under-provision of global public goods’ (Kaul et al., 1999b: xxi), a condition they believe to be the combined effect of three crucial gaps. First, a jurisdiction gap between global problems that span national frontiers and demand transnational attention and discrete national units of policy-making. There is, in other words, a mismatch between national policy-makers concerned about losing sovereignty to the market and civil society and the imperatives of an international policy environment, creating chronic difficulties with regard to who is responsible for global issues, particularly externalities. Second, a participation gap between those state actors involved in forums of national policy-making and international cooperation and non-state actors in the market and civil society who are likely to affected by relevant decisions but who have little or no hand in their authorship. There is, in short, a serious lack of symmetry and congruence between what David Held (2004:13) nicely calls ‘decision-makers’ and ‘decision-takers’. There exists, thirdly, an incentive gap between the substance of stated national commitments and international agreements and the realities of implementation on-the-ground. The absence of effective supranational authority, coupled with weak or imbalanced incentive structures, means that states and non-state actors will seek to free-ride, or lack the necessary motivation to ‘do their bit’ in tackling global problems (Kaul et al., 1999b: xxvi-xxvii).
We need not concern ourselves for the present with the proposals Kaul et al. make for ‘managing globalization’ in ways that seek to close these ‘gaps’ (Kaul et al., 1999b: xxvii-xxxiv; Kaul et al., 2003c). Instead, we want to focus attention on, and work with, the dilemmas that they valuably highlight with regard to securing public goods beyond the nation-state. We can, in particular, use their formulations as the basis for identifying certain core elements of the public interest in transnational policing. These take the form of three overlapping, mutually reinforcing issues, each of which has both an analytic and a normative dimension:
(i) Capacity. This addresses the issue of where responsibility lies - and, in normative terms, should lie - for determining the shape of, and responding to, problems of transnational crime and political violence. The public interest here lies in fashioning an ‘optimal’ response to these threats, one that avoids the problems of ‘over’ policing on the one hand, and ‘under’ protection on the other. Yet in a plural inter-state system that lacks an authoritative coordinating centre, contains a marked asymmetry of power and resources between actors, and is composed of states oriented to protecting specific (national) order rather than general (international) order (Marenin, 1982), there exists both a difficulty of determining what such a response might look like, and a problem of mobilizing and allocating institutional resources in accordance with it. We are, against this backdrop, confronted with a host of questions about how the risks associated with transnational crime and violence are - and might be - framed and responded to. Which among many such risks currently get selected for attention and intervention, and on what grounds? In whose strategic interests are transnational policing institutions steered and in pursuit of what express or implied idea of security? Upon whose authority is police power mobilized and deployed and with what effects? Who, in short, benefits from the present allocation of scarce transnational security resources and what kind of institutional configuration may yield a more just pattern of distribution?
(ii) Legitimacy. This addresses the question of who is represented or gets to participate in shaping the creation, priorities and actions of transnational policing institutions, and in holding these institutions to account for their actions. The public interest here is concerned with ensuring that those whose interests, rights or identities are significantly affected by relevant decisions are afforded an opportunity to participate meaningfully in decision-making processes. This of course raises profound and challenging issues - of both a normative and practical kind - that we cannot hope to resolve in this paper. Introducing a legitimacy component to our overall conception of public interest nonetheless enables us to obtain some analytic purchase over a transnational security constellation whose credentials in this regard are extremely deficient, as well as providing a regulative ideal that can help orient us in designing robust and appropriately situated mechanisms of democratic governance. In respect of the former, it draws attention to the lines of inclusion and exclusion that currently structure political and professional decision-making within transnational policing networks, and to the forms of knowledge, belief and opinion that shape, or fail to shape, the formation of agendas and priorities. With respect to the latter, it challenges us to think about what democratic accountability might mean in the context of transnational policing networks and to find ways of ensuring better forms of representation and participation for those whose quality of life (or, in some cases, life itself) may be significantly affected by the acts, or failures to act, of players in the transnational security field. In either case, the public interest in transnational policing requires that we conceptualize legitimacy in ways that do not reduce it to the question of outcomes (Loader, 2002).
(iii) Effectiveness. The addresses the issue, not only of how to secure the conditions for, and judge the effects of, cross-border policing practices, but also of how to determine what ‘effectiveness’ fully entails. The public interest here inheres in taking a rounded view of effectiveness, one that seeks to produce more secure environments in ways that foster and sustain (rather than undermine) other valuable social goods, such as legal and political rights. This insistence rests uneasily - and offers the basis for a critique of - a transnational security constellation in which effectiveness is often represented by political and professional actors in terms of self-evident and narrowly drawn security imperatives that remain impatient with both democratic liberties and the kinds of public deliberation about values and ends that the democratic pursuit of security ineluctably demands. We need, in other words, when trying to grasp how the public interest in transnational policing can best be given meaning, to formulate a discourse on effectiveness that connects it in these ways to broader conceptions of political freedom.
It should already be clear that these categories both overlap and are in significant respects interdependent. Questions of resource mobilization and allocation are in important ways conditioned by who gets to participate in decision-making processes about them. The motivation to participate will in turn depend upon people’s sense that their voice is listened to in debates about capacity. And the effectiveness of transnational policing bodies is clearly connected to both the scope of the goals they are tasked with accomplishing and their ability to secure public consent and people’s attendant willingness to offer assistance in pursuit of them. In the next section, we develop the connections between the three component categories of our framework by bringing this initial specification of what a transnational public interest might entail into ‘conversation’ with various models of international security, and exploring the capacity of these models to address and provide plausible answers to the questions that we have raised in respect of each component.
But before we can do this, we first have to interrogate further what is meant by the public good or interest in the case of security, and in so doing add an important social and cultural dimension to our analysis. Kaul and her collaborators operate, as noted, with a standard - that is to say, thin - notion of what a global public good is - something that remains the case notwithstanding the extended conceptual treatment that the terms ‘global’, ‘public’ and ‘good’ receive in the second UNDP volume (Kaul et al., 2003a: Part 1).  Public goods, as we have seen, are those that individuals have a convergent instrumental interest in producing but which due to various collective action problems (notably, lack of information and free-riding) are under-provided. These problems, well known in national settings, are compounded in respect of global public goods by ‘the absence of a global sovereign’ able to assume a central coordinating role (Kaul et al., 1999c: 15). The state at this level is no longer the solution (or at least it is only part of the solution), but is also part of the problem - an impediment to better global management. Hence the emphasis placed on the key role in providing global public goods of both international regimes and non-state actors from the corporate sector and transnational civil society.
But we can also think of the public good of, or interest in, security in a thicker, more sociological sense, as we have argued elsewhere (Loader and Walker, 2001; 2005). To speak of the ‘publicness’ of a good and of the interests to which it speaks in these terms is to make two distinct, if connected, claims. In the first place, it involves the claim that security as a public good has a distinctively prominent social dimension. There are two elements to this. To begin with, it involves claiming that there is something of significance in the fact that unlike such goods as clean air, transport or utilities provision, security has an inherently social foundation. Whereas all public goods, including the merely convergent public goods on which the economic perspective concentrates, obviously require a high degree of social co-ordination and regulation for their successful provision, the public good of security has the added dimension that it addresses a root problem - namely insecurity - that is itself socially generated. In other words, whereas the solution to the ‘problem’ of the absence of public goods is in all cases social, in the case of security the problem itself has a social pedigree. So security refers not only to the provision of the objectivemeasures of safety put in place in the form of police officers, crime prevention equipment, a safety-aware built environment etc. at the level of ‘problem-solution’ but also, and more fundamentally, to the risks and dangers inherent in the social environment.
Furthermore, and providing a second distinctively social dimension, even at the level of ‘problem-solution’ the accomplishment of security as a public good depends not just on the objective safety measures established (which, as noted, itself requires a degree of social coordination and regulation) but also on how the adequacy of these measure is interpreted and experienced by the individual. That is to say, security, again unlike the classic economic public goods, is not simply a matter of objective provision but also has an inherently subjective dimension. Security inheres, finally, in the senseof freedom from care, anxiety, apprehension and alarm of the individual in the face of the social environment and the objective safety measures put in place. And this subjective dimension itself must in some measure be a function of the deeper social relations of the individual. For the degree of security or insecurity a person feels depends upon their perception of the social environment and of the adequacy of safety measures. This perception is itself conditioned both by their accumulated experience of that environment and their general threshold of manageable fear, which in turn is a function of their wider sense of confidence in, and ease with their place within, the social world.
This brings us to the second dimension of our ‘thicker’ sociological analysis - namely the constitutivedimension of security as a public good. For the very idea of publicgoods presupposes an identifiable ‘public’ that understands itself to possess collective interests, one that evinces a preparedness to put and pursue things in common. Security, we may suggest, is not only a key convergent - or thin - good that individuals, according to the social contract tradition of Hobbes, Locke and others, would choose to pursue collectively for reasons of enlightened self-interest. Because its successful achievement both presupposes and vindicates a degree of social ‘connectedness’ within a population, security also possesses a thicker dimension, being among the goods that enables political community to be made and imagined in this sense. The aspiration for security against internal and external threats is - like common language and common territory - prominent among the matters that help to found and give meaning to people’s sense of ‘we-feeling’, a means by which stable communities register and articulate their identity as stable communities engaged together in a common project. Security and by extension policing, because they must assume and may give practical effect to the mutual trust and abstract solidarity that binds together individuals who remain strangers to one another, also provide an important symbolic vernacular and affective register through which this mutual trust and solidarity between strangers comes to be and remains commonly understood ascommon political community. That is to say, the instrumental and the affective dimensions of security as a public good are symbiotically related and operate in a mutually enforcing dynamic in the very making and sustenance of the collective project of common ‘publicness’.
We can then understand policing and security as public goods in both a ‘thin’ and a ‘thick’ sense and at domestic and transnational levels, giving rise to a range of permutations that we have depicted in Figure 1. Security can (1) be produced as a thin public good at both the state and at the transnational level (as proposed by the UNDP authors, and, as we shall see, by cosmopolitans). It can (2) be thick at the state level and thin at transnational level (as in various state-centric models), or else (3) thick at the transnational and thin at the domestic levels (a possibility implicit in some cosmopolitan writing). Or, finally, security can be understood in thick, social and cultural, terms at both the state and transnational levels (4).
Figure 1: Dimensions of Trans/national Security
Yet in introducing these social and cultural dimensions of ‘publicness’ to our framework for understanding the public interest in transnational policing in ways that raise this final possibility, we are faced with a deep and seemingly intractable socio-historical problem. There are two sides to this difficulty - if difficulty it is. The first is that the sense of mutual trust, common engagement and general readiness to put things in common has been and remains strongly associated with the nation-state, with expressions of national identity. Moreover, this sense of abstract solidarity, of shared ‘peoplehood’, has been a crucial cultural motivator in both the making of nation-states that embody popular sovereignty, and of the desire to constrain the institutions that compose them (Yack, 2003). There has, as Cederman (2001: 145) puts it, ‘to be a sense of community, a we-feeling, however «thinly» espoused, for democracy to have any meaning’. This is not, of course, to idealize the state as the fount of all social virtue, or the nation as the motor of modern civilization. The nation state and its security machinery, behind the shield of collective self-interest and cultural solidarity, can also encroach upon individual freedom, reflect and enact the bias of the most powerful, neglect or suppress other important sources of social knowledge and solidarity, and mobilize and celebrate an intolerant idea of cultural uniformity (Loader and Walker, 2005). This is the dark side of the idea of a national security community, and clearly any serious politics of security has to find institutional means to address these internal dangers if it is to vindicate the more positive coupling of security and political community we have outlined above.
For present purposes, however, the more urgent problem of the state template of security is external rather than internal. Here the second, flipside of the coin of the state-centred heritage of political community is that despite the deepening of global interdependence, the growth of institutions of global governance, and an arguably greater public consciousness of both these developments, sentiments of trust, loyalty and abstract solidarity remain ‘stuck’ at national or subnational levels - a stubborn fact that continues to condition the development of even a relatively mature post-national political order such as the EU. There appears not to exist, in other words, the common store of memories, myths, symbols and language around which forms of identification and belonging can coalesce and take shape at a regional or global level (Held and McGrew, 2002: 30). It appears that the bar for imagining and giving institutional expression to the public interest in this cultural sense has been set at the level of the nation-state.
This ‘thicker’ notion of ‘publicness’ nonetheless cuts across all three dimensions of the framework we have sketched for locating the public interest in transnational policing. It does so, moreover, in both negative and positive ways - as something that conditions the direction and shape of transnational policing in both its absence and its potential presence (Walker, 2002). In relation to questions of capacity, the radical asymmetry between feelings of national and transnational solidarity creates a space within which security questions come to be interpreted politically and mediated culturally in terms of the threat posed to ‘us’ and ‘our way of life’ by various categories of dangerous ‘them’ - something that has marked both US and British responses to 9/11, as well as providing a basis around which political elites in Europe have in recent years sought to ground - in negative terms - a common European identity. But it also, in a more positive vein, forces us to think about the cultural prerequisites that are required for policing to make sense, and be provided, as a global public good - either at all, or on a more equitable basis.
In relation to legitimacy, questions of identity bear crucially on the matter of who is motivated to subject transnational policing institutions to forms of democratic steering and oversight. The imbalance between strong national cultures and weak post-national solidarity in part explains why the development of such institutions have often been driven by professional and bureaucratic interests (Deflem, 2003; Walker, 2003), and why such interests have been able to pursue technocratic security agendas in ways that are remote from popular sentiment and demands, and insulated from any effective form of democratic scrutiny.  But is also prompts the question, in a more positive spirit, of the ‘public’ before which transnational policing bodies may plausibly be brought to account, and in whose name they can or should be rendered legitimate. Might the formation of a common sense of ‘publicness’ at the transnational level indeed, as Cederman (2001) implies, be a necessary precondition for developing meaningful forms of democratic governance in this field?
There is, finally, a clear cultural dimension to the ways in which effectiveness has come within the transnational security configuration to be ideologically presented in terms of narrowly drawn security registers - often in ways that come to equate the public interest with effectiveness thus conceived. A strong, exclusionary and threatened sense of we-feeling that trades in xenophobic stereotypes of the criminal other has, in other words, served as a crucial condition of possibility for a police-centred and militaristic politics of security - one that serves, in turn, to reinforce the very social imaginary that it feeds off. But there is neither anything essentialist about this constellation of identities, nor anything that says that they can be connected to security politics only in these ways. New forms of political subjectivity can be constructed, as can alternative linkages between security and identity. If this is right, then the search for a viable - and thicker - notion of the transnational public interest must encompass the possibility that cross-border policing institutions can be re/fashioned in ways that help to construct the very sense of mutual trust and civility that can motivate people to put security in common at levels beyond the nation-state, and seek to pursue it in liberty-respecting, other-regarding ways.
MODELS OF TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY
With these issues in mind, we want now to bring our emergent notion of the transnational public interest into a critical dialogue with various analytic models of global security. In so doing, we consider the potential of each model to address and offer resolutions of the dilemmas we have raised under the now socially and culturally-informed categories of capacity, legitimacy and effectiveness. Our hope is that by pursuing such a dialogue we will be in a position to develop a more theoretically robust account of what it means to think of, and deliver, policing as a global public good. We turn to this task in the concluding section. We must first commence our engagement with five models of transnational security drawn from current theoretical debates in the literature of international relations and globalization - namely, the state-centric approach, unilateralism, security regimes or communities, global civil society and cosmopolitanism. The models overlap and are not necessarily mutually incompatible, yet each continues to offer a distinctive range of perspectives on the possibilities and prospects of political arrangements beyond the state, and so of the problems and prospects of transnational security. Let us consider each in turn.
(i) The State-Centric Approach
This describes a wide umbrella of positions within the international relations literature that have in common an enduring attachment to the state as the sole or main actor in global politics. Such an orientation covers all the main variants of the realist and liberal internationalist schools, and the various hybrids that incorporate elements of both.  Traditionally, the distinguishing feature of the realist approach has been its emphasis on the self-interest of state actors, the prevalence of power politics and the consequent ‘anarchy’ of the international system (Bull, 1977) - similar to the Hobbesian state of nature but with no credible Leviathan to impose international order. Accordingly, realists see international co-operation as hard to achieve, difficult to maintain and always ultimately dependent upon the balance of state powers and interests. In this picture international institutions and regimes can do little to mitigate the anarchic impulses of the international order. Whereas realism is commonly regarded as the dominant theory - and even more dominant practice - in the history of international relations, liberalism by contrast has been described as the ‘tradition of optimism’ (Clark, 1989: 49-66). Unlike realists, liberal internationalists have tended to believe in the possibility of international peace and order being stably achieved through some harmony or concurrence of interests or even through the sharing or development of certain ideals concerning the proper conduct of international relations and its proper respect for individual and collective values. For the liberal, self-interest is always mitigated by an enlightened view about the value of cooperation, and perhaps other more substantive values, and peace and order may be stabilized or nurtured through a transnational institutional framework in which success is defined not in terms of the absolute interests of states - even the most powerful states - but in terms of the prospect of ‘positive sum’ gains for all.
For all of their sometimes stark differences of orientation as regards the motivations of actors and the viability of transnational institutions, realists and liberals, as already noted, continue to agree that the dominant actors are states. States remain the main source of capacity, the main reference point of legitimacy - thus consigning international institutions to a kind of delegated legitimacy at best - and the main source both of the definition of effectiveness and of the wherewithal to guarantee that effectiveness. Whatever their merits under the traditional Westphalian model of the international system, in conditions of exponentially increased transnational exchange, there is an inherent instability in both these solutions. Such is the range and volume of interdependence and transnational externalities involved in global decision-making and such is the range of decision-making required to address this that each approach faces profound capacity, legitimacy and effectiveness problems. The realists have severe difficulties in locating a stable balance of power to cope with the increasing scope for an anarchy of colliding interests, while the liberal institutionalist finds it difficult to locate an institutional framework with sufficiently stable state support, and, in the face of disagreement over ends and the limits of delegated power, with sufficient decision-making economy and implementation capacity to cope with the multifarious problems of interdependence. So, for example, the long history of Interpol as an organization of uncertain constitutional status in international law, and as perennially vulnerable to the indifference and neglect or self-interested exploitation of the states whose expedient resource it is (realism) or who are its contracting principals (liberalism) speaks to the limitations and instability in both positions. Ironically, the actual or predicted failure of each position - realist and liberal - can reinforce the claim of the other, but it can also lead in the direction of a number of other, more interdependence-conscious approaches to be discussed below.
(ii) The New Unilateralism
One such approach is the new unilateralism advocated by those who see in the demise of Cold War bi-polarity and the rise of the United States as by far the world’s most powerful military actor, the empirical preconditions - and, perhaps, the normative hope - of a new kind of empire. Again, there are a number of variants on a position which sees the United States as having the capacity and the legitimacy to be the ‘world’s policeman’ (perhaps the most telling active metaphor for the gradual merging of internal and external security concerns). At one end of the continuum there is an ultra-realist perspective, which holds the United States entitled to assert and defend its interest wherever they fall, and depicts the fate of all other interests as dependent upon non-interference with, or even support for, American priorities (The White House, 2002). At the other end of the spectrum is the ‘empire-lite’ brand (Ignatieff, 2003), wherein the United States provides a vehicle for spreading certain ‘civilized’ values around the globe. In this second kind of approach, the United States might indeed be projected and viewed as a kind of surrogate for failed or faltering liberal international institutions from the UN downwards, perhaps simply holding the fort until the structures damaged by Iraq and its aftermath are repaired or replaced.
There are profound problems with both of these extreme positions, and indeed with the (more common) perspectives which involve some kind of combination of the two. First, in terms of capacity, this position tends to take a myopic approach towards the nature of power. ‘Hard’ military power and, to a lesser extent, other types of internal security capacity are seen as the key to allpower, and there is little or no recognition of other ‘soft’ (Nye, 2002) forms of power - economic, regulatory and cultural - which continue to be dispersed across other sites, and which may indeed be reinforced at these other sites by American security activism and the opposition which this generates. Secondly, even if military power had not - once again and quite spectacularly - proven itself to be non-fungible in Iraq, the idea of a single state imposing solutions to the problem of global goods is profoundly lacking in legitimacy. This is most nakedly the case from an ultra-realist position, where the ‘specific order’ of the United States is treated as pre-emptive of, or at best co-terminus with the ‘general order’ (Marenin, 1982) associated with a global conception of the public interest. Yet it is also true of a more value-based approach - perhaps even more dangerously so to the extent that this lends messianic support to a greater interventionism. At worst this is merely the export of one set of understandings of how to resolve the problem of global peace and security without any sensitivity to other strategies, models and background cultural propensities. At best it is a kind of ersatzliberal internationalism, with the United States, like the crudest type of hypothetical social contractualist, assuming what the diversity of states and peoples would decide was is in the general interest if only they could overcome their collective action problems - a stance that allows little or no scope for genuine dialogue in order to test and validate, still less generate, that sense of a global public interest.
(iii) Security Regimes or Communities
The distinctiveness of the regime approach lies in its identification of the ways in which states either with certain common interests or common values - again depending upon whether the underlying theoretical orientation is realist or liberal - come together in certain policy areas - such as security, environment, economy or communication - or in certain regional groupings - such as the EU or NAFTA - to provide a framework of common rules of action and decision-making procedures. There is an inherently optimistic flavour to regime theory to the extent that it seeks to move beyond the vast problems of capacity, legitimacy and effectiveness implicit when the possibility of transnational politics is considered in the abstract and instead concentrates on more concrete and more discriminating possibilities and achievements of collaboration and common cause-making (Buzan, 1991: chs. 4-5; Little, 1997; Adler and Barnett, 1998).
However the strength of the regime approach is also its limitation. Even if it could be assumed that there is some kind of equality of representation and influence, and some level of general consideration of the common good as opposed to mere strategic collaboration, withinparticular regimes - assumptions that are surely more valid in more thickly and inclusively integrationist regional regimes (in particular the EU) than in many global policy-specific regimes, and more plausible in areas where resources are more evenly distributed than where there is a significant underlying asymmetry (as with military capacity inside NATO) - the regime approach is always left with a profound problem of the ‘outside’. Regimes can act and understand themselves as universal nations or decentred empires exporting a particular conception of the good (liberal) or certain ‘externalities’ as the cost of the internal preservation of the good (realist) to those who have no voice and little capacity to influence that conception of the good. For example, in its ‘conditionality’ approach to Enlargement and in its ‘neighbourhood’ policy generally in the context of Justice and Home Affairs, the EU is vulnerable to the charge that in making secure borders, the suppression of certain kinds of criminality, and the exclusion or return of certain types of undesirable ethnic groups its first priority, it tends to export insecurity as the price of protecting its own security. More generally, as with the famous ‘democratic peace’ thesis (Doyle, 1995; Brown et al., 1996), by which the ‘separate peace’ established by democratic states is celebrated and preserved, the regime approach can reinforce a process of global ghettoization and a myopic or unreflectively superior approach to the needs of others.
There are, moreover, limitations to the effectiveness of regimes in the face of ‘others’ just as there are limitations to the effectiveness of modern empires, something that is exacerbated by two additional features of the context within which regimes have emerged. First, regimes may have significant coordination problems or clashes of interest or values with other regimes in adjacent policy areas or other regions - or indeed with other powerful states. One need think only of the deterioration of US-EU relations in recent years to see how regimes can contribute to a new kind of instability in the post-Cold War balance of power (Kagan, 2003). Secondly, to the extent that regional or functional regimes do not fully transcend the particular interests of the states within these regimes, not only can this lead to internal division and asymmetry of influence, but also to under-capacity (Barcelona Report, 2004). Many observers of the EU’s growing capability in policing and related matters, for all its expansion since its introduction in the Third Pillar of the EU Treaty at Maastricht in 1992, would testify to the continuing deep ambivalence of Member States towards putting internal security matters in common over and above purely domestic security imperatives and priorities, and to the worrying power of certain narrow and potentially illiberal and exclusionary mobilizing frames - whether organized crime, illegal immigration, or, now, terrorism - utilized in a bid to overcome this parochialism.
(iv) Global Civil Society
One further, though partial, response to the capacity, legitimacy and effectiveness problems of the traditional state-centred approach and the unilateralist and regime alternatives to or outgrowths of that approach, is the emergence of transnational civil society (Kaldor, 2003; Keane, 2003). It is now well documented that there has been a huge and spiraling increase both in the quantity and the quality of influence of international NGOs and other movements of ‘disorganized civil society’ in recent decades (de Burca and Walker, 2003; Anheier et al., 2004). Global civil society responds to the democratic or participation deficit in transnational politics in at least four ways. First, it provides forms of representation of interests and values that are not state-centred, but which track and help to generate common or convergent preferences across states. Secondly, international NGOs in particular offer a vital means of monitoring abuses of individual and group rights in the operation of international politics - a function that is especially important in the area of policing and security. Thirdly, global civil society provides a key means for developing the idea of a global ‘public sphere’, a space of communication and interaction within which notions of a global interest may be framed, debated and generated. It thus aspires to remedy the underlying cultural base of the democratic deficit in international relations, the lack of a genuine consciousness and articulation of common interest on which transnational institutions can feed and to which they must respond. Fourthly, global civil society, and the ‘anti-globalization movement’ in particular, claims to offer a prefiguration of an alternative paradigm of world politics - one in which states are no longer the dominant institutions, violence is no longer power’s ‘final analysis’, and/or capital is no longer the dominant transactional logic and policy motor.
Clearly, any serious attempt to think through the possibility of developing a conception of a transnational public interest dedicated to the articulation and implementation of global public goods must take seriously the aspirations and achievements of global civil society. Yet global civil society can only ever be one part of the jigsaw, and indeed unless the other parts are also in place some of the effects of global civil society can be perverse, acting to undermine as much as to advance the best aspirations on which it is based.
In the first place, global civil society cannot replacethe policy capacity of the present configuration of state and transnational institutions, but only supplement and complement it. And in so doing, it must avoid two opposite dangers. One is of co-option, a danger well documented in the world of NGO politics. The other is that of negative capacity, the legitimate oppositional role of civil society threatening to descend into a form of critique which cannot articulate a positive counterfactual, or can only do so in the most vaguely utopian terms. This kind of negative capacity, ironically, can lead to a kind of default statism, with all attempts to put transnational interests or values institutionally in common condemned a priorifor their lack of democratic credentials. In the second place, transnational civil society must attend to its own legitimacy problems. Direct global democracy is not an option, both on account of the scale and the diversity of policy areas and the need for coordination between them, in which case global civil society movements must be as attentive to their own deliberative procedures and representational capacity as the institutions they monitor and criticize. Thirdly, and cumulatively, global civil society must be concerned with questions of effective implementation. In security politics, as elsewhere, an opposition culture must be seriously engaged with the implementation gap - with the consideration that the ‘evil’ of global politics in the face of unrealized global public goods lies as much in false negatives as it does in false positives; as much in inaction- the failure to translate concerns into policy and policy into normative regulation and normative regulation into effective application - as it does in illegitimate action. This requires an approach that is at once critical and constructive, as willing to support institutions for what they might achieve as pillory them for what they have not, or hold them to account for what they have wrongly pursued and accomplished.
Cosmopolitanism has, since Kant, been associated with ideas of ‘federal’ global government and citizenship. But most contemporary cosmopolitans do not pitch their institutional ambitions in such terms. Rather, the influential cosmopolitans of today such as David Held and his collaborators (Archibugi et al., 1998; Held, 2004; cf. Vertovec and Cohen, 2002), want to emphasize and give precedence to two sorts of developments. First, at the level of social ontology and normative theory, they want to emphasize, against communitarian positions, that the most appropriate focus of our attempts to improve the world should be, and increasingly can be, either the individual or humanity as a whole rather than particular state or sub-state political communities. In turn, this is based on a conception of human nature which questions the dominance, or at least the resilient dominance, of affective ties rooted in the traditions and practices of particular societies. Rather, as global circuits of communication and interdependence spread, and as institutions develop to articulate and track these new circuits, this provides a practical context within which transnational ties of trust, loyalty and common cause can be fostered. And it is this new range of transnational institutions that provides a second focus of emphasis. Not, as said, some rigid and utopian notion of universal order framed by a world government, but a strengthening and democratization of the existing mosaic of institutions at global and regional level - with regions such as the EU given great emphasis as much for its role as a prototype of the possibilities of transnational collective action as a distinct player in current transnational politics. Cosmopolitanism tends, furthermore, to emphasize the strengths of global civil society movements and their role, in symbiosis with the new institutions, in forging new forms of transnational collective identity and solidarity.
There is much that is attractive in the cosmopolitan vision. Its emphasis on the needs and aspirations of common humanity puts the question of global public goods squarely in focus, and does so within a basically optimistic intellectual and political framework. The rejection of any simple institutional solutions, and the stress on the need to develop forms of popular consciousness in conjunction with institutional development, sits well with the insight that capacity and legitimacy are intimately related aspirations, and that effective implementation of global policy - including global security policy - depends on both.
Yet cosmopolitanism remains perhaps congenitally predisposed to underplaying the continuing relevance - and value - of national and other local norms of political community, and of making the opposite error to the kind of preoccupation with national political community that we find in the different variants of the state-centred approach to international relations (Fine and Smith, 2003: 484). Certainly, modern cosmopolitans do not want to phase out national institutions. But this seems to be a grudging, pragmatic concession - a recognition of their continuing influence over and thus indispensability to the development of more robust transnational institutions, rather than a deeper philosophical appreciation of any irreducible value in local political community and the goods which they can articulate andprovide. The danger, here, is that the baby is thrown out with the bathwater, that it is assumed that because global public goods transcend domestic public goods in scope and jurisdiction, that they also eclipse them in intrinsic value, and that the appropriate model is one in which domestic public goods are simply nested within and finally subordinate to the demands of global public goods. That approach, we would argue, is flawed both as a theoretical understanding of how and why people come to place and retain matters in common and as a practical strategy to draw upon the sources of social capacity and popular legitimacy in building an effective framework for the development of global public goods - including those of policing and security.
POLICING AS A GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD
In the above section, we have presented the attempt to cope with increasing interdependence in global politics in general and in global security politics in particular in terms of a continuum marked at either end by solutions which collapse their vision of a viable and legitimate politics into a state-centred approach or into a universalist cosmopolitanism. Each of these positions, in our view, continues to gives insufficient recognition to one of the two key coordinates in any viable and legitimate global politics of security. The other alternatives are also unsatisfactory, though for different reasons. The unilateralist approach merely compounds the problems of the state-centred approach. The regime approach and the civil society suggest important institutional and cultural parts of the jigsaw respectively, but do not solve the whole puzzle.
The way ahead, in our view, is to provide a principled basis, grounded in a proper understanding of the plural structure of public goods, on which to give proper recognition to both levels simultaneously - the universal and the domestic - and from that starting point to begin to imagine the institutional and social developments which would give best effect to that plural structure in terms of the overall imperatives of capacity, legitimacy and effectiveness.
It is a clear premise of our paper that a purely state-centred conception of the public good of security - internal security as much as external security - is an inadequate conception of the range and quality of public goods in an increasingly interdependent world. Such a conception, while capable of recognizing the desirability and viability of producing security as thick public good at the state level, fails to address both the contemporary impossibility of a purely state-centred security politics and the problems of capacity, legitimacy and effectiveness that arise once one moves into the transnational arena - problems that the UNDP authors clearly alert us to, albeit using a restricted, economic conception of global public goods. Equally, however, a view, such as is explicit or heavily implicit in the cosmopolitan perspective, that global public goods - in aid of common humanity - can be the master-frame through which we conceive of and try to achieve the transnational public interest is similarly one-sided and equally inadequate. On this view, one is left either - much as with the UNDP - with the promotion of a ‘thin-thin’ conception of security at the state and transnational levels (see Figure 1), or else with a politics that seeks to build a thick ideal of the public interest at the transnational level instead of, and in opposition to, a thick conception of security located in local forms of political community - forms that are represented as an obstacle to the extension and deepening of cosmopolitan principles and sensibilities.
As we argued in developing a thicker conception of public goods beyond that developed within the economics literature and basically endorsed by the UNDP and by some cosmopolitan writers (Held, 2004: ch. 6), just because the public good of security, unlike some public goods, is about more than the convergence of discrete individual interests but has in addition an inherently social dimension, and just because, in consequence, this social dimension is woven into deep cultural understandings of what it is to constitute a social group asa public, we cannot ignore this deeper sociological dynamic in forging a comprehensive framework. That is to say, if we are to fully comprehend and optimally realize security as a public good, then the ‘thin-thin’ conception is simply not an option. Objective security depends on the social environment, subjective security depends on the quality of social relations, and our very sense of preparedness to put things in common is partly understood through a security sensibility and vernacular on account of these thick social properties, and, in turn, reinforces the very sense of trust and confidence, and of rootedness in the social world, which is the very stuff of (subjective) security as a public good. This is a tightly enmeshed and self-reinforcing set of relations. It both presupposes and consolidates the idea of a resilient unit of political community, and sense of location within that political community, the paradigm form of which remains the state.
However, the fact that there remains a strong reinforcing dynamic in support of national political community and national conceptions of security does not mean that we need despair at the possibility of the parallel realization of a global conception of the public good, or that we need conceive of that higher level merely in ‘thin’ convergent terms. We need not, in other words, be resigned as a matter of sociological default to a state-centred conception of security. In the first place, and beginning with the purely convergent conception of global public goods, the fact that states have such a strong self-interest in security means they are and will remain willing participants in collaborative strategies, for all the difficulties involved in stabilizing these strategies in institutional terms. Indeed, the problems of stabilization do no arise from a lack of awareness of the interdependence, but rather, from an acute and constantawareness of interdependence coupled with a sometimes unbridled determination to assert ones own national interest in the light of the factors of interdependence. Secondly, states may be encouraged nevertheless to think of the global public good as something more than the optimal convergence of individual state interests. To begin with, the content of the internal security imperative is in all cases similar. As Otwin Marenin (1982) once remarked, while states will have their own ‘specific order’ - their own constellations of particular and dominant internal interests they want to protect, they will by the same token have remarkably similar conceptions of general order - their understanding of (and their understanding of their need to respond to) their populations’ common desire to live in a state of tranquility and in a context of predictable social relations. Relatedly, states may also find common cause in their very understanding of the social quality of the public good of security. Earlier, when discussing alternative ways of providing security, we contrasted the rivalry between states and clubs and private actors on the one hand and the rivalry between different states on the other. For all that their particular interests may differ, states also have a shared understanding of the social and public quality of that which they seek to defend, which in turn allows, however unevenly and intermittently, for a greater imaginative openness to the possibility of othersites andlevels of social or public ‘added value’ in the accomplishment of security.
Yet, of course, it would be naïve to assume that even democratic states if left to their own devices will find their way to an optimal conception of the global public good of security in addition to an optimal conception of their own public good. We are claiming something much more modest than that; namely, that states have a constant incentive to think of collaboration in protection of their national security interests, and that, after a century which has seen such defining state-transcending security events as Hiroshima, the Holocaust, the nuclear arms race, and, now, the rise of network terror (Robertson, 1993, Kaldor, 2003: 112), they possess some of the common vulnerabilities, value predilections and imaginative tools to think at the same time about the possibility of a thicker global model of security too - one in which they understand themselves as representing not just national citizens but also potential ‘citizens of the world’ and where to share a concern for common humanity is both a necessary assumption and a constituent part of a sense of global security.
So we must start with states in building the institutional and social framework necessary for the realization of some thicker notion of the public interest to parallel and complement state public interests. But equally we must not and we need not finish with states. Alongside states, and the bargaining structures and institutions set up between states, we need some kind of influential regional and global forums in which those who are not fettered by state interests and whose voice and ‘citizenship’ is not defined in exclusively statist terms can give fuller rein to their political imaginations and think through the ways in which security may be achieved as a thick public good at the global level. States, we believe, are like any actors who have much invested individually in a particular framework of collective action but who can nevertheless imagine another or additional framework of collective action that might better serve the interests they hold in common. That is to say, they may lack the individual will to seek the optimal achievement of these common interests within the existing framework, yet just because of their awareness of this, they will not necessarily or consistently be averse to the construction or evolution of alternative frameworks which doemphasize common rather than merely concurrent interests, and which may provide both the cultural momentum and the adjusted incentive structures to realize these common interests. Indeed, if this were not true in principle, then it would be very hard to understand and explain existingdevelopments of international and supranational legal and political regimes that move beyond the thin and unstable logic of realism.
What we need then, to couch our overall institutional model in only the most abstract of terms, is a kind of anchored pluralism - anchored in states as the primary motors of common action and sources of institutional initiative but pluralist in its principled recognition, not least by states themselves, that there are two levels at which we can think of security as a thicker public good which are not reducible to one another but which need different registers of debate and institutional forums for their articulation. At the second level, transnational civil society and regional regimes would be important sources of initiative and key participants, as they are already defined in part in terms of their transcendence of national interests. Professional and administrative corps who have become occupationally distant from national concerns would also, inevitably, be significant players at this level. This, of course, would still leave open the question of how to address and resolve the possible tensions between the ‘aggregative’ or convergent proposals or approaches arrived at in the purely national and inter-national discourse and forums on the one hand, and the more transcendent proposals and approaches arrived at in regional and global forums on the other. But at least the tension, and the need for its resolution, would be institutionally recognized on the basis of a principled understanding of the pluralism of levels of the public good rather than marginalized or occluded within a one-dimensional world view and institutional design.
Paper prepared for a workshop on ‘Constabulary Ethics and the Spirit of Transnational Policing’ IISL, Onati, Spain, 13-14 July 2004
Draft work: Comments welcome, but please do not cite without authors’ permission
forthcoming in A. Goldsmith and J. Sheptycki, eds., Crafting Global Policing. Oxford: Hart
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 Kaul et al. do, however, in the course of their analysis make a valuable distinction between ‘final’ global public goods, which are outcomes (such as a pollution free-environment) rather than goods in the standard sense, and what they term ‘intermediate’ global public goods (such as international regimes) which contribute to the production of these outcomes (Kaul et al., 1999c: 13). We might in this vein, describe security as a final global public good and transnational policing as an intermediate good that can, under the right conditions, contribute to its production.
 Consider, as an instance of this, the following conundrum. Which constituencies - beyond the immediate victims and their families or representatives - are likely to be outraged or moved to action by an abuse or atrocity involving, say, Europol officers or members of a UN peacekeeping mission? Possible answers appear to include: (i) hardly anyone at all; (ii) co-nationals of the victims; (iii) members of transnational human rights organizations; (iv) co-nationals of the officers concerned (v) European or globally conscious citizens ashamed that ‘our’ police have acted in such a way. Part of our point here is that the answer currently is unlikely to be (v). This does, however, cut two ways. The lack of affective attachment to transnational police organizations makes it less likely that public audiences will seek to deny that ‘our’ police could ever do such a thing, thereby laying the potential ground for a less prejudiced politics of security (Walker, 2002).
 See in particular the so-called ‘neo-neo debate’ in which neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalists over the course of the 1980s and 1990s gradually converged on a common agenda of debate and priorities, and even began to share some founding premises (see Baldwin, 1993).