CFSP after the Constitutional Treaty: the Stakes for the Future

Udo Diedrichsand Funda Tekin addressed the question of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Constitutional Treaty in the light of the recent events of its rejection by the considerable majority of the French and Dutch populations. As first remarks Diedrichs tried to reassure the audience stating that the possible non-ratification of the Treaty would not represent in principle the end of CFSP, thus reframing the huge emphasis that has been put on the Constitution in this respect. A lot could be done without the Constitution, if Governments of the Member States will agree on that.

After getting rid of the «Constitutional Obsession», Diedrichs presented four crucial dimensions which guided his analysis, approaching CFSP from different angles and underling different concerns beyond it. Firstly he described the Strategic Dimension of CFSP as foreign policy. In this categorization one may find the lack of vision in CFSP that is generated by the uncertainty of political convictions in the new Members States and the taboos created after the Iraqi crisis. The very question to be addressed therefore concerns the role of CSFP in relation with the overwhelming emergence of ESDP in civil, military and security organization: what is left if we take ESDP out CFSP? Who is guiding the other?

The second speculation attained the Institutional Dimension of CSFP as a System of Governance. The possible collapse of the Constitutional Treaty’s ratification process should not be seen as the end of the important institutional innovations brought by the text. Some elements may still be saved as regard the possibility of enhanced cooperation (i.e. battle groups already approved and planned by Member States), the European External Action Service, that maybe created via an inter-institutional agreement, the European Defence Agency, which is already functioning independently from the Constitutional Treaty, and the enhancement of the Petersberg tasks, which maybe agreed in a pragmatic way. Trickier would be the case for the creation of the double hat of the Foreign Affairs Minister and for the inclusion of the mutual defence clause. Nevertheless, concerning the former, it is still possible to reinforce the power of the High Representative, allowing him to chair the Foreign Affairs Council and letting him participating to the College of Commissioners meetings, while for the latter it could rely on WEU provisions, although without an operational impact.

The third aspect highlighted, concerned the Social Dimension of CFSP. In particular the issue of the digestion of the past enlargement and the shaping of a consistent CFSP raises worries about group building process. CFSP’s ‘esprit commun’ is at stake in an ever enlarged Europe if not addressed properly as a redefinition of intra-group behaviour. Current development shows that much has still to be done in order to form a collectivity characterized by harmonic relations and mutual trust between its components: Member States, Civil Society, NGOs, diplomats and military actors and institutions.

The last aspect treated brought on the need for Leadership in the International Dimension of CFSP. The need for a European Leader able to conduct Europe’s foreign policy may today find an answer in the strong role played by Germany, France and the UK in a number of important issues, stemming from the debates on sensitive topics around the Convention, up to the definition of basic choices for CFSP. But the idea of a Franco-German enlarged ‘directoire’, including the UK, may find the resistance of the excluded High Representative as well as the one of smaller and middle-range Member States, fearing domination and developing an inferiority complex. Moreover, all the three political leaders of the supposed leading triangle, suffer from different forms of weakness: Blair might be replaced by Gordon Brown in the coming years as his political height decreased with the recent elections; Schröder may not survive elections in September; Chirac has been put under pressure after the results of the French referendum of the last 29 May. Hence it is argued that the current situation does not open to a strong leadership in Europe, unless the situation, at least in these three countries, will not change, delivering a fresh, strong and genuine impulse to EU’s CFSP.

Diedrichs and Tekin concluded putting forward three possible scenarios for the future of CFSP: the first one is rather optimistic and accepts the failure of the Constitutional Treaty but tries to compensate it trough viable solutions under current agreements. Governments must learn the lesson from the Iraqi war and change their behaviours into higher convergence and closer cooperation in order to build a coherent foreign policy; the second is more pessimistic, obliging Member States to cope with the possibility offered under the Nice Treaty, oscillating between phases of regular functioning and insurmountable impasses when views are fragmented. The pressures created by enlargement may also push some Member States to build solutions outside the treaties, creating various groups of willing and capable actors; the third scenario is a catastrophic one, highlighting the possible incremental decline and consequent end of Europe’s foreign policy. Driven by a lack of leadership, strategic orientation, capability of working as a group, the CFSP will be dissolved in a parcelization of national polices.

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