Claudia Aradau approached the dilemma between security and liberty, pointing out that the security argument prevails over the liberty one, even when freedom itself is being invoked. In order to unpack the logic that makes liberty subordinated to security, she has looked at how liberty is conceptualized in the work of Thomas Hobbes. The trade-off between security and liberty has its roots in Hobbes, therefore it is important to understand how this trade-off functions. She has argued that there are two main approaches to liberty: a juridical and an economic one and the two are inextricably related for Hobbes.
In the juridical approach, the liberties that are enshrined in law have an internal limit, i.e. what threatens the law itself and hence the state. The trade-off between security and liberty functions only as long as the conservation of the state is not at stake. The ‘rule of law’ can therefore be invoked only for those who are not against the law. It has therefore been invoked for suspected terrorists only to the extent that they are not ‘real’ terrorists.
The economic approach is closely related to the juridical one, as Hobbes gives an expanded definition of safety/security to include prosperity of the citizens. For the purpose of state conservation, it is important not just to restrict certain liberties, but also to keep citizens happy. The state therefore will have to create certain economic liberties, e.g. the freedom of movement or of commerce. The proper usage of these liberty means security.
The paper has argued that the dilemma of security and liberty cannot be solved by keeping just these terms, but needs to incorporate a concept of justice that can function when the usage of liberty is being limited for the purpose of security. Whether such limitation is legitimate or illegitimate is a matter of justice and not security.