Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency in an Enlarged Europe

Objectives

The project seeks to provide data on transparency, accountability and effective risk management for the consortium Observatory. This involves a number of seminars, conferences and reports. The aims are to identify and define the parameters of transparency that might be compatible with the requirements of effective risk management and accountable, responsible, open governance across increasingly ‘securitised’ policy areas where ‘securitisation jeopardises openness, accountability and responsibility. The objectives in months 0-18 are to discover:

1) what transparency means and how it is expressed. This will be done via an exploration of the theoretical concepts and their expression in contemporary government and EU doctrine. It will identify governance mechanisms and analyse the law and procedures for accessing official information, structures and instruments associated with accountability and responsible open government in order to ascertain which are compatible with effective and appropriate risk management across the expanding range of ‘securitised’ policy areas in the enlarged EU committed to realising sustainable, freedom, security and justice;

2) to define transparency-accountability parameters to facilitate objective assessment of what transparency provisions may be appropriate and compatible with effective risk management and with accountable and responsible governance in the enlarged EU; and,

3) to identify decision, transparency and accountability paths with respect to contentious areas of EU policy where internal and external security intersects, exceptionalism and openness are compromised (eg airline passenger data, anti-terrorism measures and the expansion of Europol competence. What is acceptable in one state is not in another. Common EU action is acutely difficult given the exceptionalism of security issues. To explore this better a policy trace will be done to trace the, how, what, when and why of the content of a decision. The time lapse between between the initial step and the entry of the decision into the public and parliamentary domains will be mapped. The justification for the measure will be assessed and mapped on an openness and accountability matrix. Documentary analysis will be supplemented by interviews with key officials and actors.) Identifying minimum appropriate transparency parameters is essential to ensure legitimacy and respect for EU governance and to make the FSJ goals real and sustainable.

This research is innovative, will contribute to knowledge and is and policy-relevant. Transparency is a contested and contingent concept. The exceptionalism of the ever-widening security agenda that permeates increasing areas of EU policy potentially compromises accountability and responsibility mechanisms taken for granted so far. This endangers open government, legitimacy and accountability in the eyes of EU citizens. The elaboration of a transparency-accountability matrix would provide us with a means of discovering and logging the potential for evolving common and convergent transparency parameters across securitised policy areas throughout the enlarged EU. This could make a contribution to citizens’ sense of equality and non-discrimination. It would help to identify points at which appropriate and effective risk management requires a reduction in transparency and accountability structures and mechanisms; and what security pre-conditions must be met before transparency criteria can be operationalised. It is necessary to balance the requirements of ‘security’ and attendant exceptionalism with the overarching EU goals of freedom, security and justice. The research adds value to existing scientific knowledge about transparency and moves beyond the original suppositions of the Commission in the early 1990s about the value and purpose of openness and transparency. It goes beyond the EP reports on transparency. It will contrast EU goals, structures and mechanisms with those in selected member states where security exceptionalism is dealt with in very different ways: eg. Sweden, Finland, Austria, Germany and the UK (especially because of its Irish problem) It will pay attention to Swedish, Austrian and Finnish experience which some MEPs have argued is exemplary. The research therefore starts with secrecy rules, open government and related parliamentary authority in the member states. It then re-conceptualises transparency to explore in comparative perspective what transparency requirements might be needed to sustain over-arching EU goals of democratic open governance whilst trying to address the issue of the limits placed on transparency as ever-increasing securitisation of (low politics/pillar 1) policy areas proceeds.

More specifically, the research addresses the above in months 6-18 through the completion of the following tasks (beginning with conceptual mapping of transparency matrix, documentary analysis, interviews with key government officials in Sweden, the UK, Austria, Finland and Germany, and in the Commission): It will:-1 review the state of the art in understanding the tension within and exceptionalism of the security field in respect of transparency and openness (WP6.1) in relation to sustaining FSJ. 2. Identify and assess of the implications of the core provisions of official EU documents and those of relevant states in respect of transparency relating to security (WP6.2). 3. identify challenges to operationalising transparency in the security field (WP6.3). 4. assess the implications of enlargement for operationalising transparency (WP6.3) across the fuzzy internal-external security divide where different conceptualisations, traditions and levels of government accountability collide with different mechanisms and levels of transparency across policy areas. By doing this, we expect to elaborate transparency-accountability parameters that might provide a measure against which to discover what transparency and accountability instruments, structures and mechanisms are both appropriate to and compatible with effective risk management in different securitised policy areas.

Description of work

The core aim is to identify and define transparency parameters that might be compatible with effective risk management. Our research questions ask what policy issues do governments and the EU decide should qualify as exceptions to the assumed rule of openness. Is the selection justified in the public domaine? Why? How? When? By whom? How legitimate is this seen to be? (eg level of civic opposition/MPs/MEPs). Are the same justifications to exceptionalism invoked across policy areas within and across specific states and by the EU? Are they ad hoc rationalisations? Are they credible? Are contradictions disguised and ignored on the lowest common denominator basis? Why, how and what are the effects on operationalising commitments to uphold freedom and transparency in policy areas where governments normally require and justify secrecy. What problems arise as a result as internal-external security boundaries are eroded? Can transparency be operationalised in these areas? What are feasible remedies? The work begins with 1) a literature review to discover the state of the art; and to identify existing procedures, rules, structures and instruments. This forms the basis for mapping the pilot transparency matrix which will be discussed with policy practitioners; 2) analysis of the core elements essential to reconcile legitimately and openly the operational requirements of security with the practice of liberal, democratic open governance across increasingly securitised policy areas; 3) re-conceptualisation of transparency and amendment of the pilot transparency map to understand better what security pre-conditions must be met in the newly emerging security areas before transparency can be operationalised on a common basis across the EU. The objective is to discover and to assess what constraints are thereby implied for accountable and responsible governance in the enlarged EU.

The research problem:In the EU openness and transparency concerns are acute under pillar III: should they always be set aside to meet security exceptionalism ? We ask why and how do politicians in some countries that boast about their democratic credentials (eg the UK) justify weak openness and accountability mechanisms? Is public acquiescence or ignorance the norm rather than active citizenship? At EU level is security exceptionalism sustainable and credible in view of mounting public lack of trust?Is there a contradiction between the rhetoric and practice of accountability, legitimacy and openness which are leitmotifs in the democratic socio-politico-legal-economic discourse construct of the EU? What level, mechanisms, structures and instruments of transparency are compatible with effective risk management across the new policy areas? The hypothesis is that securitisation interferes with the goals of transparency, accountability and responsibility in the realisation of a sustainable area of FSJ. Looking at pillars I,II and III, we take highly contentious issues where security is invoked to justify measures that then become the subject of transparency exceptionalism. How can these objectives be operationalised to realise a sustainable FSJ via EU agencies and institutional structures without undermining the democratic values of openness and responsiveness to the very EU citizens FSJseeks to protect? Is there evidence that pillar III’s inherently weak accountability structures and instruments may be retained and expand into and be used to justify restrictive practices of transparency in any policy area or competence which has been ‘securitized’? What measures ar needed to alert us to security exceptions that might be introduced to exempt policies from pillar I transparency and accountability provisions?The exceptionalism of transparency in the security field is common. All states have rules governing high security matters covered by formal and official secrets acts. Civil liberties bodies, such as Statewatch often closely monitor these. Our research asks what are the problems of reconciling openness while creating a sustainable zone of freedom, security and justice in an enlarging EU at a time when the traditional boundaries between external and internal security are being eroded. This is sometimes referred to as a process of militarization of the internal security agenda of the EU. In order to better understand transparency, it will be disaggregated into structures, procedures and rules. A comparative study of its differential application in the member states will be undertaken . Particular attention will be paid to specific borders (eg. Austria and new states, Finland and the Baltics, UK - an island state, Spain and Morocco) where states with different accountability structures and traditions meet, and where border issues interface with issues of inclusion and cohesion.EU enlargement poses several risks (see wp7) to the security-transparency agenda. These include those that are culturally bounded and informed (eg disparate historical experience, practice, level of expectations and understandings of core concepts of liberty and security, citizenship, transparency, the rule of law and freedom). The risks can compromise the effective and efficient attainment of EU policy goals in highly controversial policy areas having a security dimension (eg borders, immigration and policing) as well as those of lower apparent immediate political salience ( We seek to identify through interviews with officials and policymakers what risks they prioritize, which ‘risks’ they think should be exempt from transparency rules, and how and what justification they give for such exemption. We then ask how and if this might compromise the attainment of EU transparency and accountability goals).We then ask how the EU might reconcile legitimately and openly the operational requirements of security with the practice of liberal, democratic, accountable open governance across policy areas, which are increasingly coming under the umbrella of ‘security’. This is essential if citizens are to respect, believe in and work to uphold the values and notably liberties espoused by the EU and a zone of freedom, security and justice. The underlying question to ask policymakers and agencies is what security pre-conditions must be met in the newly emerging security areas before transparency can be operationalised? Is there an emerging consensus on this? Does it correspond with the public statements of government and the EU institutions?

Methodology

The research employs qualitative and comparative analysis to identify, chart and assess the state of the art of existing scholarship and documents. A database of transparency papers, rules and official papers will be created. Qualitative inter-disciplinary analysis of core papers in the database will assist in the identification of a common understanding of core concepts. This will supplement the legal-analytic work of Workpackage 1, 3, 5, 7 and 8. This will be the first phase of our work. Throughout, philosophers, historians, social scientists, cultural theorists, lawyers, gender and security experts will inform the research, those engaged in research in communicating contested and contingent political messages, and will engage practitioners, including ECHO. Particular attention will be paid to involving women scientists in seminar deliberations, and especially in those leading to the selection of case studies of policy sectors for detailed empirical study in the post-18month phase of the research. The reason for stressing this derives from the assumption and the expectation that women’s conception of security is more immediate and closer to citizens than security viewed through the prism of traditional government-bound transparency and accountability structures. The female perspective is expected to enrich our understanding of the precise definitions of policy areas and appropriate and effective risk management balanced with the norms of accountability, and extend our conception of the goal of freedom, security and justice.

In order to determine a common base from which to undertake the empirical case study work, it will be essential to reach a common understanding and definition of liberty. The different philosophical and ethical understandings of liberty derive from different historical traditions and West European views of liberty. Freedom implies a specific conception and precise definition of liberal democracy entrenched in a constitutional arrangement and embodying a set of governing institutions. These are supposed to foster and sustain democratic practice. As EU enlargement proceeds, the transparency challenge to the institutions and EU’s practices is to find a way of accommodating different traditions, to develop and integrate them consensually across the EU to develop security and while sustaining democratic freedoms for citizens.

In the second phase, the challenge is to identify the EU’s definition of the rule of law and order and its operationalisation through appropriate functional intensity (COM2002/247 final), compliance capabilities, and decision-making geared to the type of action envisaged to give effect to law and order. To do this, we will supplement documentary analysis with open-ended interviews of key officials in the EU institutions as well as with Europol to ascertain 1) their view of security risks 2) instruments they believe to be clear, effective and problematic; and 3) to identify compliance rules, obstacles and procedures. Discovering what these are is essential if risk is to be managed appropriately as well as effectively. This phase of the research will generate new data and is novel. We will use the results to formulate the research for the next phase (up to month 18) and to define the agenda thereafter up to month 60.

In the third phase, we will first identify and second scrutinise and investigate specific policy mechanisms and instruments at the EU’s disposal to manage risk in the new security areas (eg immigration and border control) (relation with other WPs). This will involve 1) collection of new data, and 2) data interpretation. Finally, this will require qualitative assessment against the criteria for freedom and transparency established in phase one of the research. Dividing the work like this is justified because politicians commonly assert that security measures are necessary to sustain freedom, security and justice. The wider securitisation of EU policy agenda, however, challenges liberty by stepping into decision-making practices and decision paths that are normally ‘more transparent’ and open than those traditionally available under ‘high security’ areas. Is EU citizens’ freedom to enjoy the underlying values and rights of a zone of freedom, security and justice thereby jeopardised and compromised?

The work to be accomplished during these three phases will form the basis for the research to be undertaken from months 18-60. The second part of the project will require the elaboration of the appropriate parameters of transparency that might be compatible with the requirements of effective risk management in the designated areas. This will juxtapose the operational requirements identified in part one from the practical and implementation requirements required by policymakers. This research will seek answers to the question of what security pre-conditions must be met in the newly emerging security areas before transparency can be operationalised across the EU?

Implementation

The research will begin with a review of the existing literature (including Statewatch) and key EU documents on transparency to confirm the state of the art, develop conceptual precision and provide the benchmark for the detailed analysis of the transcendence of the security agenda across policy areas previously seen to lie outside the remit and concern of government agencies prosecuting an external ‘high’ security agenda and therefore believed to be far more open to scrutiny by the public and/or their representatives and institutions of accountability.

The research will then select for in depth comparative analysis (some areas under pillar I and pillar III where transparency and openness are imperfect (notably in respect of crisis prediction, and the post Sept 11 security and anti-terrorism measures) and where states differ in the degree of openness permitted. Sweden, the UK, Finland, Austria, Germany provide contrasting examples: Sweden because of its established socio-political culture of openness; the UK - because of its weak openness although it is an old liberal democracy, its security link with the USA, and the Irish problem which brought security close to the citizen in the UK, Finland because of its borders and history of self-constraint to preserve its special status and stability, Austria as a neutral bordered by applicant states, and Germany as a postwar ‘new democracy’ whose democratic commitments and credentials were tested by illiberal forces through the 1960s and beyond. We ask what structural, procedural and political mechanisms exist that make such transparency imperfect, and what arguments are used to justify their retention. Then we evaluate their implications are for EU structures and procedures designed to give expression to EU values of liberty and freedom. A core aim is to identify and define the parameters of transparency that might be compatible with the requirements of effective risk management.

By identifying and assessing the above, and by examining the tensions through the prism of case studies on the management of borders, immigration and public access to EU information, we expect to be able to discover potential means of creating a framework which makes the exceptionalism of the security agenda 1) subject to appropriate and acceptable common rules of transparency and accountability; and 2) amenable to the overarching EU requirements and goals of freedom, security and justice; and 3) helps to identify decision and transparency paths appropriate to effective risk management in expanding policy areas subject to the ‘security’ challenge in a manner compatible with responsible, accountable democratic governance. . We will identify points of difference in 1) risk assessment, 2) instruments used to promote effective risk management. Then we will evaluate those instruments in terms of EU transparency and accountability criteria. The aim is to chart the present situation in order to better understand competence that exists already, and what physical and non-physical security pre-conditions must be met in the newly emerging security and ‘securitised’ areas before transparency can be operationalised on a common basis across the enlarging EU.

Relationship to other workpackages: The project charts the current situation with reference to particular internal security flash points: specific borders where effective risk management is problematic; and to current EU transparency deficits and measures which might be deemed desirable, but not necessarily feasible or compatible with effective risk management. It will use current rules and practice as the indicator of the official view of relevant member governments; compare these with EU aspirations as set out in key documents; identify points of convergence and divergence; and isolate flash points in respect of the securitisation of policy areas where transparency and accountability can be elusive or weak and where such weak accountability may be officially justified by reference to ‘security needs’. The focus is on actual transparency rules and mechanisms. This workpackage therefore complements workpackage 13 on securitisation, liberty and law. It goes beyond identifying transparency provisions to seek to understand what security pre-conditions are seen to be necessary before transparency and accountability through traditional public and representative mechanisms (such as parliaments) can be introduced as common practice across the EU.