Policy recommendations

This section's articles

• An Analysis of the Current Common Consular Instructions

  4 December 2006, by Balzacq Thierry, Guild Elspeth, Szymborska Anita, Weinar Agnieszka
  This policy brief presents and critically discusses the content of the Common Consular Instructions (CCI). In this context, the aim of the paper is therefore to offer an analysis of CCI which covers a broad range of aspects, including their operability, their coherence, as well as the technical, legal and political problems they raise. The policy brief then proceeds to address three main sets of questions: What are the technical issues related to the CCI? What are the legal problems related to CCI? What are the political problems related to CCI? Throughout, a particular emphasis is put on the proposed amendments of CCI and their potential impact on individual rights.

• An assessment of the proposals of regulation and decision which define the purpose, functionality and responsibilities of the future SIS II

  4 December 2006, by Hobbing Peter
  The reform of the Schengen Information System (SIS) is a major milestone in the development of the Area of Freedom, Justice and Security, if not for the EU as such, but the process has not been carried out with the appropriate levels of publicity and democratic control. With the Commission proposals of May 2005 marking the emergence of the new SIS II from the more secretive ‘Third Pillar’ environment, there is now a golden opportunity to examine the proposed legislation thoroughly. It is widely held that the current drafts are a clear improvement on earlier versions. However, a number of sensitive features still need attention, in particular how far new mechanisms and the wider involvement of enforcement and judicial authorities have come with legal safeguards to ensure that data protection and other human rights are respected. The introduction of biometric data into alert records, the interlinking of alerts and possible ‘mergers’ with separate databases (e.g. VIS) should also be examined.

• Centres for Third Country Nationals

  4 December 2006, by Bietlot Mathieu
  The term ‘camp’ identifies all the premises where those third country nationals intending to enter the European Union are involuntarily placed. This concept includes all the systems of imprisonment by which the immigrant is deprived of his/her rights and liberties. While the camp can be ‘open’ or ‘closed’, the close nature usually predominates in practice. An EU policy dealing with the reception of asylum seekers and their accommodation in camps is still in its infancy. The discretionary power exercised by the Member States in this field is very important. Also, there is a wide diversity of camps for third country nationals in Europe. Special attention needs to be paid to the respect of fundamental rights and the individual needs by each third country national who might be residing in camps. This is at times difficult to ensure due to size of the camps, the lack of resources as well as because of the negative image linked to those immigrants who are placed in these camps. Also, in practical terms there is some confusion among the different statuses of the immigrants who are might be found in the camps. Finally, the statistical data concerning how many third country nationals are actually inside camps has not been yet centralized nor at EU level neither at national level.

• Intelligence, Police and Democratic Control: European and Transatlantic Collaboration

  20 November 2006, by Bigo Didier
  The diversified types of relations between intelligence services, judicial police services and judges in Europe, are being considerably transformed by the «war against terrorism». The current trend of a mass-surveillance based on the gathering of mass-intelligence, the interconnection of data-bases and the instantaneous treatment of huge flows of information, destabilizes the fragile balance between intelligence, fundamental rights and democratic control. Indeed, it transforms an ever-growing group of individuals into potential suspects and might thus lead to grave violations of fundamental rights. Moreover, the efficiency of this approach in the quelling of transnational political violence is subject to serious doubt as any data now seems to qualify as intelligence. In this context, the technical dimension of the inter-service and international collaboration in matters of intelligence must not blind the European institutions to their political component. Indeed, the role played by the US administration in the setting of the European intelligence agenda and in the collection and treatment of huge amounts of data concerning European citizens and inhabitants seems to erode the fundamental principle of accountability. Hence, the European institutions should take concrete steps, some of which are suggested in this note, in order to recover a legitimacy that can only be achieved through accountability and to live up to the European standards as far as the democracy, liberty and fundamental rights are concerned. This will also enhance the reliability, accuracy and legitimacy of the intelligence necessary to an effective protection against political violence and arbitrariness.

• The Coherence of the adopted measures, during the last years by the EU with regard to organised crime, namely the fight against human trafficking and the UN Convention on organised crime - the Palermo Convention and its 3 Protocols

  20 November 2006, by Mitsilegas Valsamis
  The fight against organised crime has been at the forefront of the EU JHA agenda for the past decade. However, the EU has not been acting in a void. It has been instrumental in the development of global action in the field, in particular by participating in and concluding- within its respective powers- the UN Palermo Convention. This has resulted in a comprehensive EU criminal law and enforcement framework in the field of organised crime, money laundering and human trafficking and smuggling. The EU framework is largely consistent with global standards, with the exception perhaps of the prevention/rights field. In the light of the plethora of legal and policy instruments in place, the primary emphasis at this stage must be on the implementation of these instruments in Member States and an evaluation on how they work in practice. Particular emphasis must be placed on the protection of the rights of victims, in particular in the field of trafficking in human beings, but also the protection of fundamental rights and civil liberties, which may be challenged by the proliferation of enforcement tools and a broad definition of organised crime which may lead to the expansion of surveillance and the uncritical use of the European Arrest Warrant. Last, but not least, emphasis must be placed on the prevention of organised crime and trafficking to the extent that the EU has competence to act on these issues. The note contains a number of specific recommendations on each of these points.

• La cohérence des mesures adoptées ces dernières années par l’UE concernant le crime organisé, particulièrement la lutte contre le trafic et la traite d’êtres humains et la Convention de l’ONU sur le crime organisé – la Convention de Palerme et ses 3 protocoles

  20 novembre 2006, par Mitsilegas Valsamis
  La lutte contre le crime organisé a occupé une place privilégiée dans l’agenda JAI cette dernière décennie. Cependant, l’UE n’a pas agi dans le vide. Elle a favorisé le développement de l’action globale et internationale dans ce domaine, notamment en participant et en signant – dans les limites de ses pouvoirs respectifs – la Convention de Palerme de l’ONU. Il en a découlé un important cadre de droit pénal et d’action au niveau de l’UE dans les domaines du crime organisé, du blanchiment d’argent et du trafic et de la traite d’êtres humains. Le cadre de l’UE est largement conforme aux normes internationales, à l’exception peut-être des domaines de la prévention et des droits. Considérant la pléthore d’instruments légaux, l’accent doit être mis au stade actuel sur la mise en oeuvre de ces instruments dans les Etats Membres ainsi que sur l’évaluation de leur fonctionnement effectif. Il faut insister plus particulièrement sur la protection des droits des victimes, notamment dans le domaine du trafic d’êtres humains, mais aussi sur la protection de droits fondamentaux et des libertés civiles qui pourraient être remises en cause par la prolifération des instruments répressifs ainsi que par la définition large du crime organisé qui risque de conduire à un renforcement de la surveillance ainsi qu’à un recours indiscriminé au Mandat d’Arrêt Européen. Enfin, l’accent doit être mis sur la prévention du crime organisé et du trafic d’êtres humains dans les limites des compétences de l’UE. Cette note propose des recommandations spécifiques sur chacun de ces points.

• Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council concerning terrorist recruitment –– Addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation (COM/2005/0313 final)

  20 November 2006, by Burgess Peter
  The immediate post-September 11 period produced a flourish of activities on the European level. These activities are characterized by three types of action: political reorientation with respect to transatlantic politics of the newly declared «war on terror», activities aimed at quickly creating legal and operational tools for use in addressing real and perceived threat in Europe, and a re-examination of the European «homeland» as the possible origin of terrorist threat. The latter type of response, which is most relevant to the Commission’s communication on terrorist recruitment, is however also the slowest to emerge. Though already in its communication of 17 October 2001 the Commission affirms that «efforts to stamp out international terrorism must be underpinned by policies addressing sources of radical discontent», the Council Framework Decision of 23 June 2002 on Combating terrorism makes no mention of either radicalisation or recruitment. In March 2004 the European Security Strategy «Fight against terrorism» affirms that «action must also be taken to address the root causes of insecurity and the factors which contribute to the emergence of terrorism».

• Pour une évaluation critique de la Communication de la Commission au Parlement européen et au Conseil concernant le recrutement des groupes terroristes – Combattre les facteurs qui contribuent à la radicalisation violente (COM/2005/0313 final)

  20 novembre 2006, par Burgess Peter
  La Communication de la Commission se propose d’être une contribution préliminaire au développement d’une stratégie de long terme de l’UE visant les facteurs contribuant à la radicalisation et au recrutement en vue d’activités terroristes. La Communication est construite autour d’un ensemble important de postulats sur la nature du recrutement et de l’extrémisme et de sa relation aux questions d’immigration, d’intégration, d’éducation et de dialogue interculturel. Elle propose une série de mesures pour prévenir ou décourager le recrutement de terroristes. Cependant, ce faisant, elle omet de répondre à nombre de questions concernant les dimensions sociales et culturelles de la radicalisation violente et sur les manières appropriées de mettre en relation principes juridiques, exécution de la loi et motivations individuelles d’une part et terrorisme d’autre part. Mais, dans ce contexte, l’aspect le plus important est que la Communication suppose que la radicalisation est un ensemble de faits statiques qui peuvent être abordés au travers d’un éventail fixe d’actions. La recherche sur le sujet suggère, au contraire, que la radicalisation est un processus social et culturel nécessitant une réponse dynamique tenant compte des facteurs culturels.

• What are the options for improving democratic control of Europol and for providing it with adequate operational capabilities?

  8 November 2006, by Bruggeman Willy
  The question constantly arises if Europol’s operational capabilities should be further developed and if parallel to this the democratic control of Europol must be upgraded? The political belief in the future of Europol remains strong, notwithstanding the fact that Europol apparently has difficulties in obtaining its politically and legally assigned position. The Constitutional Treaty and the Hague Program are very ambitious as far as the future of Europol (and Eurojust) is concerned. As well the Parliamentary control as its operational capabilities are subject of further clarification. Providing Europol with adequate operational capabilities AND improving democratic control are intrinsically interlinked.

• Comment améliorer le contrôle démocratique d’Europol et lui fournir les capacités opérationnelles adéquates ?

  8 novembre 2006, par Bruggeman Willy
  La question de l’attribution de capacités opérationnelles supplémentaires à Europol et de l’augmentation du contrôle démocratique de cette agence réapparaît constamment. La croyance politique en l’avenir d’Europol reste forte malgré le fait qu’Europol ait des difficultés à obtenir la position politique et légale qui lui est assignée. La Traité de Constitution européenne et le programme de la Haye sont très ambitieux quand à l’avenir d’Europol (et d’Eurojust). Le contrôle parlementaire tout comme les capacités opérationnelles méritent d’être clarifiés. L’octroi de pouvoirs opérationnels adéquats ET l’amélioration du contrôle démocratique sont intrinsèquement liés.

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